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Abstract
The effect of the Arab uprisings on the interplay of state and non-state entities is revealed as influencing the emergence of multiple players of non-state status pursuing democratic rights, and attempting to dismiss regional despotism as an intrinsic element of ongoing transition in the Middle East. The study focuses on the positive overall effect on the Kurdish movement of unity and cooperation between KRG and PKK-PYD actors in achieving Kurdish harmony, and the resulting interconnected paradigms vis-à-vis their influence and interaction with regional players.  Given the rise of the Kurds in Syria and the KRG’s regional importance as the first actual Kurdish de facto state entity, the PKK’s role appears as the key for unifying and institutionalizing the relatedness of the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria. An empirical understanding of the Kurdish case, explained through a conceptual model of ‘multi-dimensional interrelations’, may further clarify how the theoretical framework can be applied to International Relations.






 A National Conference should be held on the democratic foundation against imminent dangers. This conference should be held by a shared committee or council that performs diplomatic duty and defines common strategy for Kurds. This committee or council should represent all Kurds. After the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, there is danger of a severe attack. The Kurds should ensure their unity in order not to suffer what happened to the Armenians and the Greeks of Asia Minor.   Abdullah Ӧcalan​[1]​ 


1. The Impact of the Arab Uprisings on Syria and the Kurds
The ‘modern’ Middle East (referring more or less to the region’s post-Ottoman history since 1918) has suffered at least a century of various wars and conflicts. The bloodshed reached its peak in the aftermath of the Iraqi War (2003) which signalled first the end of Saddam Hussein’s 30-year rule, and secondly the onset of a new era of change that has swept the broader Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to the heart of Middle Eastern state entities such as Iraq and Syria. The changes, still unfolding, have seen the rise of de facto state actors such as the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) in the North of Iraq (1992) as well as non-state entities like Rojavayê Kurdistan (Western Kurdistan, 11 November 2013) in the North East of Syria, but the changes have not stopped there. 
Another case in point is the rise of the Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, (داعش, IS, July 2013); this is a powerful mercenary army, recruited after the transition of power to the Iraqis (28 June 2004) and aimed at establishing a ‘Caliphate’, i.e., an Islamic state.​[2]​ Furthermore, Islamist governments were also favoured. Thus in July 2006 the “Greater Middle East” map, part of George W. Bush’s “Greater Middle East Initiative” (12 December 2002)​[3]​ prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters and published by the Armed Forces Journal (June 2006), provided–among others–for a Sunni, a Shiite and a Kurdish Iraq.​[4]​ 
These changes, whether territorial or political in introducing new modes of governance, should be viewed as a second natural transformation following the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1915-1916), given that the Middle Eastern region was an artefact created by external powers that has been subjected to constant rearrangements. Under these circumstances, the Kurds are no longer struggling to prove their existence, but are trying to determine the status under which they can live in their own land.​[5]​ Likewise, the U.S. administration, regardless of differing views, cannot but try “to have a firm strategic footing”, especially when “the current balance of power has shifted in the region” and regional politics have been built primarily upon allegiance to a “network organized along tribal lines” at the top of which the chief(tan) is found.  This is a “social organization [which] predates the formation of the present nation-states”, and persists even to this day.​[6]​
This in turn explains why the U.S. administration, still in search of “a firm long-term U.S. strategic vision of how to preserve enduring U.S. interests”,​[7]​ has difficulty in adjusting its policies to deal with the rapidly changing region on the basis of the needs and the nature of Middle Eastern societies, apart from applying individual tactics in an effort to “adjust any given environment to the [U.S.] needs rather than adapt itself to international events”.​[8]​ 
The U.S. shift from supporting secular forces to support for Islamist elements and back again to considering people’s demands vis-à-vis the latest massive demonstrations in the region is a typical case. The administration’s continuing engagement with the region underlines how “the Middle East is still of strategic importance to the United States”​[9]​ because “Unless conflicts in the Middle East are resolved, as the centre of conflict today, where wars will be conducted, new developments won’t be able to occur in other places”.​[10]​ In this changing environment, it is quite obvious that the rise of the Kurds and Kurdistan constitute an actor of strategic importance that the U.S. appears willing to defend as an effective force and to further support, especially under the current circumstances of an expanding IS reality.​[11]​ 
On these grounds, the interest of this article lies in exploring the unique nature of the subject matter. Scholarly writings on this particular topic are limited since this is a newly-emerging phenomenon for both the media and for International Relations (IR), and as such has mostly been analysed in a handful of news reports. So far scholarly arguments have considered Arab policies and the lack of international interest in the Kurdish case of Syria as reasons for having kept the Kurdish movement marginalized. There is, therefore, an obvious dearth in the combined comparative approach this article attempts to pursue. This is the case starting with the proclamation of Rojavayê Kurdistan as a de facto autonomous region in North Eastern Syria and as a heterogeneous geographical entity, with its own administration, military forces (namely the Popular Protection Units or YPG), and its own structural system, different from that of the KRG. 
Yet, as I have previously argued, even before the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings (December 2010), the beginning of the 21st century signalled “partly that the Kurds in Syria have broken their prolonged silence for the first time in the twenty-first century” vis-à-vis the 2004 silent Kurdish uprising in Syria.​[12]​ Somewhat prophetically I had also argued that “it is very possible that George W. Bush’s ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’ with its aspirations for regional democratization, will have further repercussions on the region’s Kurdish issues”, for example taking into account the authorization by the State Department of funds for reformists in Syria.​[13]​ Thus we understand that a series of events beginning directly after 9/11, combined with the conservatism of U.S. Middle Eastern foreign policy, have created the need for alternative allies to preserve U.S. national interest(s) in the region as prioritized in the U.S. foreign policy discourse. 
In this regard a series of events stands out: for example in 2003 there was a Kurdish gathering outside the UNICEF building in Damascus on World Children’s Day (25 June 2003), requesting the UN right of every individual to have a nationality, followed by Bashar Al Assad’s initial tolerance towards the Kurdish Uprising, along with US initiatives to fund the Washington Conference of Kurdish Exiles (November 2003) and the establishment of ‘Radio Free Syria’​[14]​ in view of the imminent Gulf War III (2003).​[15]​ Then there was the influence of the neo-conservatives’ rhetoric which was responsible for the U.S. administration’s warnings to Syria “to choose either to align with it or against it”;​[16]​ and the Congressional ‘Syrian Accountability Act’ (PL108–75, 20 November 2003) which provisioned sanctions against the country as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. 
Finally there was the U.S. project of the region’s ‘transformation into a model of democracy’ via interventionist practices able to endanger the supremacy of its leadership, as in Saddam’s Iraq, Gadhafi’s Libya, and Mubarak’s Egypt.​[17]​ Likewise, U.S. funding of the American-based Reform Party of Syria (2003) and possible U.S. connections since 2002 to Syria’s Kurdish opposition in exile, or of Syria’s Kurdish groups as part of the country’s reformist groups, can be perceived in the same context. 
The aftermath of Gulf War III and Saddam’s fall versus the rise of the first legitimized non-state Kurdish entity of regional and international recognition (i.e., the KRG), found Syria’s Kurds partly mobilized for the first time in their recent history. I would claim some years before the Arab Uprisings that “the meeting in 2006 between the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria (KNAS)–a delegation representing KNAS and the Kurdish National Congress of North America headed by Sherkoh Abbas–and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee along with members of the U.S. Congress, as well as with State Department officials” had paved the way for expecting future developments in Syria’s Kurdish issue.​[18]​
Regional events such as the KRG’s empowerment from 2005 onwards and external pressure for reforms in Syria, reached their peak in 2011 with Bashar Al Assad’s granting of citizenship (April 2011) to 120,000 Kurds who had been stripped of their Syrian nationality as unregistered (maktumeen) or infiltrators from Syria or Turkey and Iraq (ajanib) since 1962.  This explains the Syrian leader’s immediate shift in favour of a ‘positive and constructive dialogue’ with the new U.S. administration based on ‘common interests and mutual respect’.​[19]​  In the same vein, he attempted to mitigate relations with rival neighbouring states such as Turkey, a policy that in hindsight was doomed to failure. The Qamishli football match (12 March 2004) between Arabs and Kurds ended in clashes, and the tanks sent into all the Kurdish towns became a landmark in Syria’s Kurdish politics, signifying the onset of the Kurdish revolution in Syria. 

1.1	Multidimensional Interrelations: Essential Interactions 
As a follow-up to my previous work on the International Relations of the Middle Eastern region and based on my primary research and field work findings, this paper’s objectives are twofold. First I attempt to show how the different Kurdish movements and their policies are interlinked, namely the Kurds of Syria, the KRG and the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Therefore I discuss how Rojavayê Kurdistan is connected to Turkey’s Kurdish movement, especially since Abdullah Ӧcalan’s capture (1999), and why the role of both the PKK and the KRG in Kurdish politics is crucial.  Secondly, I aim to confirm and further analyse how my theoretical framework, a conceptual model of ‘multi-dimensional interrelations’ that I have developed, based on an empirical understanding of the Kurdish case, can be applied to IR.
I regard the Arab Uprisings (December 2010) as a factor that has influenced the emergence of non-state actors, using the advancement of the Kurdish status in Syria, i.e., the creation and rise of Rojavayê Kurdistan, as an especially relevant case in point; The Kurds have further consolidated their status in view of the KRG’s de facto independence as well as the role of these actors as an intrinsic part of the on-going transition in the Middle Eastern region. This emergence has been further boosted, taking into account the contemporary situation of the Middle Eastern region, sunk in a facile Sunni–Shia divide and the development within it of two camps: on the one hand the U.S., the UK, France, and Saudi Arabia, and on the other Iran, Russia, China, and Hezbollah.​[20]​ This divide has led to the current sectarian turmoil and is also believed to have had economic consequences.​[21]​ 
I therefore demonstrate the effects of the Arab uprisings on favouring the role of the regional non-state actors, enhancing their interrelations and links as well as the interplay between state and non-state entities, and focusing specifically on the Kurds of Syria who are pursuing their own interests and foreign policy agenda. Theoretically, given the rise of multiple players of non-state status searching for democratic rights in an attempt to bring an end to regional despotism, as well as the need for a reformulation of the Middle Eastern political setting, I stress the ‘multidimensional inter-relationship’ of foreign policy, IR and wider politics, within which further interrelations and interactions occur, while also underlining the need for a holistic approach to IR in order to move away from mere inter-state explanations and bridge the gap between agent and structure, time and space, epistemology and ontology, objectivity and subjectivity. 

1.2 Non-state actors as agents of foreign policy change: Definitions 
I perceive the Kurds as ‘non-state’ actors,​[22]​ a perception which reflects those entities who are not organized into a state, who are characterized by an amorphous proto-state status, those who consist of a group of individuals with common goals and who are able to interact in the international system. Therefore, their identity can vary; they can (a) be independent; (b) belong to a state (or a group of states); they might be (c) non-governmental organizations or (d) branches of groups under a leading group; or else (e) an entity that is internationally recognized. They can be economic, religious or socio-political actors, all exerting political influence.​[23]​
At present, the KRG is the only legitimized de facto Kurdish state entity, since it has the required economic, diplomatic and political means to exert the sort of influence accorded by its status, first on the regional level and then on the rest of the Kurdish movements. This paper argues that the KRG, along with the dominant Kurdish players in Turkey and Syria, could bring about a unity that would benefit the Kurdish movement as a whole.  On this basis, I examine the triangular relations between KRG (Rojavayê Kurdistan or Kurds of Syria) and PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party),​[24]​ in order to show how the PKK can exert pressure and influence the KRG to have positive relations with the PYD, how the PYD can use both the KRG and PKK for the facilitation of the Kurdish cause in Syria and thus establish interactions with Syria’s Kurds. 
I also show, finally, how the KRG, as the leading Kurdish movement with well-established regional neigbouring and international diplomatic relations, can first ensure support, whether regional or international, for the Autonomous Cantons in Rojavayê Kurdistan; unite the four different parts of Kurdistan into the much-desired Kurdish State; and how it can benefit from the further consolidation of its status resulting from its interactions with the other two parts. Given PYD’s contacts with Iran and other revisionist forces in the region in combination with the KRG’s balanced relations with both Ankara and Tehran, it could possibly have a positive effect on the KRG and its regional relations.
It is then understood that when discussing the Kurdish cause there can be no disadvantages or setbacks, but only mutual benefits, since one Kurdish movement can affect another positively only if inter- and intra-disputes are diminished and the intra-Kurdish inter-relations can be based solely on the mutual goal for the establishment of the Confederate Kurdish State, anticipated since the 1920s.  However, such solidarity requires the Kurdish leadership to set aside its eagerness for dominance.  First must come the consolidation of Kurdish status, and perhaps a pan-Kurdish Dialogue or Conference, followed by the establishment of a pan-Kurdish Congress that would serve as a legitimate vehicle through which to set the boundaries of a common foreign policy agenda. This, in turn, would dictate the boundaries of power. But unity presupposes the overall prioritization of the Kurdish national interest, as similarly pursued by the rest of the regional and international states. 
Before examining the various Kurdish policies in Rojavayê Kurdistan, it should be made clear that non-state entities can also have, and exercise, a specific foreign policy. In fact this indicates the theoretical implications, first of their existence as considerable players, and then of the interaction between them and the various regional and international state actors. Thus, foreign policy no longer seems to be among a state’s privileges since the very concept of power has been expanded.  Non-state actors have a more important and more direct role in the dynamics of IR (and not just on states’ foreign policies), as is shown by the impact of the KRG’s foreign policy practices and the interaction of states with the KRG on regional politics and also internationally. The same can be also said about the PKK as well as the most recent role of the Kurdish movement in Syria. 
Foreign policy seems to me an interactive process undertaken by one or several individuals differing only in the name of the institution they represent. Final decision(s) are mainly articulated by the most dominant figure in the hierarchy, which is the leadership; the latter is influenced by various structural and ideational factors (internal or external), by the context according to which the decision are taken, and by the agendas of the actors involved. As the end product of this process, these decisions constitute responses to the activities of other actors in the international system and stem from state or from non-state actors.​[25]​ On this basis, the KRG, the PKK and the Kurds of Syria currently appear to exert their foreign policies at the most critical times for Middle Eastern developments. 
As my analysis also shows, IR, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Politics (domestic/international) are intrinsically intertwined, although often viewed as separate. Acknowledging this interdependence is the only way in which a holistic picture can be constructed of the dynamics that link and explain patterns of interaction and mutual impact between non-state actors such as the Kurds, divided as they are into several state-based entities and regional states, away from powers such the United States and the evolving nature of the regional and international systems.​[26]​

2. PKK–KRG–Kurds of Syria: examination of an inter-relational triangle 
On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of our struggle [starting on 15 August 1984], we are on the verge of historic developments… This 30-year long war – through a major democratic negotiation – is at the stage of coming to an end…[emphasis added]  With these results [the 9.8%], the HDP, with its broadest base will be today's democratic and effective opposition and the future's democratic ruling party.   Abdullah Ӧcalan​[27]​


2.1 How the trajectory of Turkey’s Kurdish leaderships has influenced ‘Rojava’: a factor for Unity 

The years 1998 and 1999 (up to 15 February) when Ӧcalan left Syria and was later captured in Kenya were as significant for the Kurdish movement in Turkey, found in transition, as they were for the Kurdish movement in Syria, greatly influenced by Apo’s guidance and ideological acumen as a farsighted philosophical figure in Kurdish politics. Successive unilateral cease-fires since the early 1990s and Ӧcalan’s declarations (years before the party’s Seventh Congress on 20 January 2000) from Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley that the PKK was ready to turn to “political methods… [as] we [the Kurds] do not favour a separation from Turkey as unrealistic”, indicates the party’s orientation.​[28]​ 
The search for a political solution to the Kurdish issue, and thereby the politicization of the PKK’s struggle as depicted at the Seventh Congress, marks the third and final phase of the PKK’s strategy towards democratization, following the shift from the first stage of setting the ideological framework and the second of a militaristic approach in pursuit of armed struggle and later as a self-defence strategy.​[29]​  Not only did this important Congress, whose proposals were reflected in Turkey’s 2004 reforms, signal the PKK’s political transformation into KADEK (Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan–Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) in April 2002, and a year later into the KGK (Kongra-Gel, in 2003) with regard to replacing the committee as a decision-making body with an assembly, but it also signified the movement’s shift towards a legal means of struggle and a major adjustment in the PKK’s ideological discourse and practice.​[30]​
The change in favour of legitimization was also reflected in the creation of a series of parties, supportive of political and cultural rights for the Kurds. Their closing, mainly by the Turkish authorities, as hotbeds of separatists and terrorists led to a succession of political parties differing only in their name changes, with the last change being the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party, Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi) which was renamed the DBP (Party of Democratic Regions) on 11 July 2014).​[31]​ Nor were such changes accidental, being interlinked to and reflective of the stages the movement has so far undergone. 
Abdullah Ӧcalan’s ‘Road Map’ (September 2003–1 September 2004) is revealing, not only because of the movement’s reorientation towards the politicization of the Kurdish cause but also, compared to past claims for independence, because of the calls for autonomy within a democratic Turkish Republic instead of a militarized strategy based on an ‘all or nothing’ policy that was previously dominant.​[32]​ The structure set by the party since the beginning of the 21st century is remarkable and is a prototype, in terms of its organization, of a state type of entity.  
Regional developments include the aftermath of the Iraqi War, the futile and short-lived Damascus Spring doctrine that based “freedoms and rights” on the “will of the authorities” rather than on the “will of the citizens”,​[33]​ and thereafter the Hezbollah-Israeli War (2006), and the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings leading into the incursions of  Islamic State (IS), a radical armed group operating in tandem with persistent U.S. attempts to stabilize the Middle Eastern region through the spread of the democratic process according to Western standards.  Today these factors fit, first, the Kurdish objectives for self-determination within the context of the recognition of rights and, secondly, with Ӧcalan’s discourse a decade ago, when he advocated that “the democratization of the Middle East runs through Kurdish democratization”.​[34]​ Under these circumstances, the Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK, 20 March 2005) was established and in 2007 was renamed Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK, Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan). 
Undeniably, inter- and intra-Kurdish dichotomies and a lack of cooperatively-based political unification were the primary factors preventing the Kurds from taking advantage of the weak situation of the regional states during Gulf War I (1980-1988),​[35]​ still a lurking danger today, although the coming decade suggests a golden opportunity for the Kurdish movement as a whole. As I have argued since 2010, “bearing in mind recent developments in Turkey and the prospect of success for the AKP in prevailing over the country’s military elite (either with or without U.S. aid) then developments similar in nature to those of Iraq’s Kurdish Issue are very likely to be observed in relation to Turkey’s Kurds within the coming decade or so”.​[36]​ The military’s counterbalance has now become a reality, whereas Kurdish forces in the Middle East seem to realize that unless they come together, a holistic success for the Kurdish movement is somewhat unlikely. This is because the Kurds are surrounded by assorted states pursuing their own distinct interests. Therefore “The PKK’s establishment of relations with different states is not strategic but involves low-level and tactical relations”.​[37]​ 
Although the PKK was created “seeking the unification of all four parts”, the movement began to take a new direction, renewing its strategy in 2000.  After Öcalan’s imprisonment and in relation to global and regional conditions, 
The PKK worked on new strategies as a response to this newly emerging environment. The new paradigm was the new vision in four parts of Kurdistan and the other people in the Middle East. On the basis of this paradigm, new political entities started to be formed to address the Kurdish issue and implement government rule. In Turkey it was the KCK, in Rojava the PYD, in KRG it was the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, and in Iran PJAK. [. . . ] These parties are united because all of them accept Apo as leader and agree with his strategies. Yet these parties are not all PKK but they are united as each has its own separate agenda and strategy according to its situation and different socio-political needs and methods for struggle.​[38]​ 
The model of Democratic Autonomy versus nation state building was exemplified by Abdullah Öcalan, who suggested overcoming the idea of nation states as the source of social and political division in the Middle East: 
The nation-state aims at creating a single national culture, a single national identity, and a single unified religious community. Thus it also enforces a homogeneous citizenship. Self-ruling and democratic autonomy is a flexible, multi-cultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus-oriented. In the frame of this kind of self-administration an alternative economy will become necessary, which increases the resources of the society instead of exploiting them and thus does justice to the manifold needs of the society. 
In 2007, Öcalan defined democratic autonomy as a means to express the situation of the Kurdish people in their approach to those outside their community and to enable internal democratization as a force against internal backwardness within Kurdish society. Autonomy was “not seeking to form a state, respecting present borders and state structures, being a means of enabling local interests to be represented within the state”, and  finally, as “being a structure that would enable the Kurds to meet their own demands that would be operated in conjunction with existing state institutions.”  In 2010, he further refined this vision of democratic autonomy as “not being based on ethnicity” and “not being limited to Kurdistan, being a system which substitutes centralized administration with local administration, being a system which intends to fuse participatory democracy with representative democracy” and lastly, as “being a form of self-governance.”​[39]​ This model is very similar to what is projected by the Kurdish Administration in Syria; namely a self-governing model relying on people and on their own forces, but bearing in mind also its own particularities such as a heterogeneous geography and demographics, since Kurds are distributed all over Syria in contrast to its structural differences with both the PKK and the KRG.
The PYD is different because “it suggests a system of governance on the local level, whereas the PKK is operating on a national level in Turkey; whereas the KDPS in Syria wants a federal Syria within which Kurds have constitutional rights”.​[40]​ Here there is the experience of the KRG example and the nation state-like structure in place in Southern Kurdistan since 2003; while the silent revolution that started in Rojava on 19 July 2012 has led to the establishment of a democratic national congress by creating a cantonal system based on self-rule and the mode of democratic autonomy (January 2014), as will be further examined below. The differences then between each Kurdish movement exist more in their ideological perceptions of the formation of Kurdistan and realistic opinions about maximizing their influence, than in basic strategic issues.
Despite Kurdish claims providing for various modes of formation of the autonomous Kurdish regions, according to the requirements of each Kurdish situation or their different agendas and controversies over control of Kurdistan, and given such statements as “the KDPS do not want the PYD to govern Rojava” or “the KDPS wants to have more authority in Rojava”,​[41]​ the fact that the Kurdish movements are interrelated paradigms nevertheless remains the same, as demonstrated in the model below.  

2.2	  KRG: a balancing player
The KRG is the architect of recognition of the Kurdish movement on a regional and international level with regard to its achievement in becoming the first legitimized de facto state entity (having exerted a certain degree of de facto independence). Thus the PKK’s increasing power should satisfy the KRG since it contributes equally to the strategy of establishing and further consolidating Kurdish status in the region. The empowerment of the PKK, especially after the capture of Ӧcalan, has had a positive influence on the Kurdish cause, in light of recent reassurances by Ankara about its commitment to carrying on the peace process.​[42]​ The political standing of the Kurdish leadership and the party in the Middle East, especially since a potential settlement of the Kurdish cause in Turkey seems to have become a reality, should only be perceived by the KRG as its most sincere ally in the region for the pursuit of its national interests. Yet structural and ideological differences are deep, being first and foremost the dependence on foreign aid.
According to Ilham Ahmed,
The difference lies in the ideology of life. The KDP believes that the state is the provider of freedom to the people; therefore the KDP seeks to establish a nationalist Kurdish State which is different from the PYD, which believes that the state is an instrument of authoritarianism. This is the reason for the oppression and poverty of society. Therefore, societal freedom is more precious than the establishment of a national Kurdish State.​[43]​ 
She also maintains that “The recognition of legitimacy comes solely from the people”; however the KRG also considers international and regional recognition as critical.​[44]​ 
Abdulhakim Bashar sees it building upon “the international respect the Council enjoyed during meetings with powers such as the U.S., the UK, France and Turkey”.​[45]​  As Chairman of the KNC and Vice President of the Syrian National Coalition for Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian National Coalition), Bashar explains that:
We work for the sake of a federal Syrian state… [whereas] the PYD applies an informal regional administration in the name of a democratic polity rather than in the name of the Kurds solely. The future of Syria’s Kurdistan is connected with the general situation in Syria and with the unity of the KNC. The U.S. views the need for the Kurds to enjoy their rights in a future Syria and guarantee constitutional rights as well as the right of the Kurds to participate in the administration of the state and in Syria’s Authority.​[46]​
This being the case, the PYD perceives the KRG as a supporter of regional and international interests, and in Rojava as an instrument of the policies of the KNC (Kurdish National Council, Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê) and the Syrian Coalition,​[47]​ in contrast to its discourse for self-rule and accommodating Arabs, Assyrians and other political parties. But as Salih Muslim maintains, “the status of Rojava is not a matter of recognition since we are not a separate state, but is a question of relations” which however also requires a certain level of recognition.​[48]​
The political struggle has intensified between the PYD and the KRG with mutual accusations of office closures in each other’s territories and turning a blind eye to the activities of the Syrian regime and IS respectively, along with the closure for several months of the entire border between Syria and Northern Iraq and the KDP’s decision to dig a border trench between the Kurdish part of Syria and Iraq. Other areas of contention include the YPG’s affiliation with the PKK forces versus the KDP’s peshmerga forces, in addition to the PYD’s assertion that they had been defending Kobane in Syria against IS for two years whereas the other regional powers, including the KRG, had not taken seriously their calls for help against the threat posed by IS, not only for Syria’s Kurds but the whole of the region. 
Meanwhile the PKK’s unilateral initiative to encourage the declaration of the formation of a local administrative council, known as a canton, in the district of Shingal (where the Yezidi minority reside) was counter to the constitution and the laws of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq and was rejected by the KRG as illegal.​[49]​ Intra-Kurdish confrontation between the PYD and the KNC over control of the administration in the Kurdish-dominated regions in Syria, with the PYD exerting de facto control of much of Syria’s Kurdish region from July 2012 and demonstrating a credible military power against both IS and the Free Syrian Army, should be left aside as they are tactics belonging to the 1970s and 1990s when KDP-PUK clashes as well as fights between them and the rest of the Kurdish movements were happening.
Yet as Reza Atun points out, the main differences can be pinpointed in “PKK’s criticism of the notion of power and the rejection of the notion of the nation state” and the support of a democratic self-rule based on a confederal system of governance. This is the case in heterogeneous and dispersed Kurdish-populated areas such as Rojava: “The Cantons represent this system to the extent that all entities, whether they be religious or not, can express themselves freely and be included in this form of democratic governance where everyone express themselves freely”.  Thus, the first step will be to establish democratic self-rule on the local level followed by the formation of Confederalism in Turkey at the national level.​[50]​ On this point the PKK distinguish itself from the KRG, which “is identified by a nation state mentality”.​[51]​ Another fundamental difference between the PKK and the other Kurdish movements has been the PKK’s ambition to unify the four parts of Kurdistan into one Confederacy.  This raises the critical problem of leadership of the four parts of Kurdistan. 
The only possibility of achieving realization of the Kurdish State seems to be through a Confederated Kurdish Entity consisting of four autonomous regions, whose leadership could consist either of a committee of four representations of each part of Kurdistan, or in a one-person rule in the sense of a symbolic leadership consulted by a committee from all other parts. Yet even in this case the question of who is going to rule Kurdistan remains the last major issue that resolution of the Kurdish case will need to address. In this context, as well as the problem of how to manage this administration more effectively, there will be tensions and jostling for power. 
However, the rise of IS in the region as an imminent threat to all the regional and, in the long run, international powers has reminded the Kurds of their common goal. If the enterprise of a Kurdish State is a priority in the Kurdish foreign policy agenda, they must abandon their political inter- and intra-Kurdish differences to achieve it.  Peshmergas, YPG, PKK successfully united to fight IS in parts of Diyala, keep them out of Makhmur, and cooperate in the area of Kirkuk. Similarly, the KRG mediated to persuade Turkey to allow the arming of Kurdish fighters, and to permit pershmerga forces to cross into Kobanê vis-à-vis the war still raging with the IS in the Kurdish-inhabited areas.
As Reza Altun points out, the need for Kurdish unity to overcome past regional policies of using the Kurdish movements against each other or, on the other hand, the unconditional surrender of the Kurdish movements to the establishment of political relations with regional states, is a reality acknowledged by all sides: “The present situation in the Middle East needs cooperation and sharing”.​[52]​ Similarly, according to Duran Kalkan,
For the PKK and the KCK, the defence of Kirkuk is the same as the defence of Amed, and Sinjar the same as Kobanê. We have the same sensitivity towards all the provinces and districts of Kurdistan. The KDP should understand well that the best for the Kurds in this period is the maintaining of unity among the Kurds. Political relations with other powers can be more realistic, valuable and can bring a result if and only if they are based on Kurdish unity. The relations and alliances which are not based on the unity of Kurds or on the power of this unity may not be so good for the Kurds in this chaotic and multi-war situation in the Middle East.​[53]​ 

This is a period in which Kurdish national unity is most needed.​[54]​  In this context the KRG reconsidered its policies and filled the ditches it had initially excavated.  
Kurdish unity, then, is what needs to be kept in mind especially vis-à-vis the common IS threat today; tomorrow the deeds that a successful peace process, begun after 1993, and with KRG’s mediation as well, could produce gains for the rights of the Kurds and thus the Kurdish movement as a whole. Therefore it should not constitute a short-lived tactical approach but a long term strategic vision, sealed with a Pan-Kurdish dialogue prior to the Pan-Kurdish Congress as its platform. While compromise and mutual cooperation among today’s Kurdish political movements are imperative for progress to continue, stressing the uniqueness of the attempt creates pressures that raise multiple difficulties considering the distinctive agenda of each movement. 
Not only is the need for regional and international allies more than ever critical, especially in view of the current transformation of the region and the new vacuum of power arising for the Kurds in particular, but the need of the people for representation according to objective criteria is also crucial. Nor should Kurdish alliances, whether with Tehran or Ankara for example, allow for negative impacts such as dichotomies and fragmentation within the Kurdish movement itself. If they do, then the common goal of coexistence and self-determination will once again be buried in the dust of historical transformation.  

Rojava, as the PYD uses it, has no significance. To obtain a meaning it should be said as Rojavayê Kurdistan, otherwise by itself it means only the West.​[55]​

2.3	 Rojava in the context of the  Arab Uprisings 
The declaration in November 2013 of the autonomous Kurdish region (Western Kurdistan, Rojava) was not a surprising event, but rather an inevitable outcome, following the failure of Bashar Al Assad’s ‘Spring Doctrine’ in 2000 and the 2004 March events in Qamishli. However, this dynamic, and more recently the preservation of Rojavayê’s Kurdistan status, can be traced back to the expelling of Abdullah Ӧcalan from Syria in the aftermath of the Ceyhan Agreement (21 October 1998), according to which Syria, recognizing it as a terrorist organization, would end its support for the PKK while also forbidding its members from entering the country and pursuing anti-Turkish activities.​[56]​ The mobilization of the Kurds in Syria due to PKK’s activities vis-à-vis the camp of Masum Korkmaz was also attributed to Ӧcalan’s decade-long stay in Syria. Thus the influential role of the Kurdish movement on the Syrian movement originated during these early stages of the Kurdish struggle. 
According to the literature, it is no accident that “Kurdish refugees in Syria were in favour of nationalist slogans” compared to the Levantine Kurds who, established for generations, were less responsive to the need “to confront Damascus”, and had lacked political representation or organization during 1946 and 1957.​[57]​ Kurdish division following the arrival of the French and the deportation of the Kurds by Ankara to Iraq and the Levant, and the consequent heterogeneous location of the Kurds in Syria explain the delayed revolution, but above all it was the structure of Syrian society and to an extent the majority of the states in the broader Middle East and the Gulf region, in the form of independent entities which united and thus were based on ties of kinship.​[58]​ Writings on the first Kurdish nationalist committee in Syria, the Khoybun (1927-1944), consisting mostly of members from Turkey before the rise of the first Kurdish national party in 1957, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (which soon became the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria), are indicative.​[59]​
Today the Democratic Union Party (PYD) appears to be the Kurdish party that enjoys the support of most Kurds in Syria. Founded in 2003 the party, with its own military wing YPG, has played a striking role in the fight against terrorism, and specifically in confronting the IS. The bloodiest fighting occurred in January 2013 when the PYD confronted both the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and IS in the town of Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ayn). 
On 12 November 2013, the Constitutive General Council of The Joint Interim Administration was announced, with 86 delegates, representing 35 different parties and civic and social organizations from the Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian and Syriac communities, in attendance. At the second meeting (15 November 2013), the formation of three regions, consisting of 60 members, was declared.​[60]​  These three Cantons​[61]​ in the PYD-controlled Kurdish provinces of Jazira (Cizrê, 21 January 2014), Afrin (Efrîn, 29 January 2014), and Kobane (Kobanê, 27 January 2014), would then fulfil the project of democratic autonomy through the formation of committees for drafting the constitution for the electoral system of the joint interim administration.
This Kurdish initiative for democratic transformation in Syria (Qamishli, 8 May 2014) was taken on primarily by nine Kurdish parties​[62]​ aiming at the self-administration of small territorial districts (reminiscent of the Ancient Greek nation-states).  One should add that they have since opted for a self-governing model based on a direct democracy and the participation of all individuals in decision-making processes, in an attempt to overcome the centralization policy of the Syrian Ba’ath party.​[63]​ Each Canton in Rojava therefore has its own constitution, government, education systems and social services, parliament, courts, laws, and municipalities, as well as its own Asayhish (police), People’s Defence Forces (YPG) and Women’s Defence Forces (YPJ). 
The outbreak of the Arab Uprisings that swept the whole MENA region, changing the political map and increasing pressures for further changes, appears not only to have met Kurdish requirements but has also further boosted the Kurdish cause, leading to its steady settlement within this decade. This has been the case, more or less, in Syria, whereas the peace process in Turkey is still in progress. In particular, this wave of transformation took place in the heart of the Middle East, that is, in Iraq and Syria. External and regional pressures for reforms increased with the first attempts of Turkey and Qatar who supported the formation of the National Coordination Committee (NCC), an umbrella group of leftist, nationalist and Kurdish factions founded in June 2011. Faced with their common Islamic threat, IS, and with KR’s Presidency backing, sixteen Kurdish political parties in Syria (apart from the PYD), formed the Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNC, 26 October 2011). 
Yet the formation of an opposition front culminated in 2011 with the creation of the Syrian National Council (SNC), including members of various Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, demanding Assad’s overthrow.  The SNC’s non-negotiable stance as far as the moderate Kurdish National Council (KNC), supported by the KRG, is concerned, dominated by its Kurdish agenda, led to a weak Syrian opposition. This was further exacerbated when the Kurdish Supreme Committee was formed (24 July 2012) under the Hawler (Erbil) Agreement, with the aim of uniting all Syrian Kurdish parties under the umbrella of the Kurdish Supreme Council set up with President Barzani’s support. This institution arose from the merging of the SNC and Western Kurdistan People’s Council with the PYD into a Committee of ten. It was mutually agreed to have one army, one parliament, although according to the PYD’s co-chairman Salim Muslim, “these two Councils wanted to join the Syrian Coalition. We refused to become part of the Syrian coalition”.​[64]​ 
Taking into account the United Kurdish Forces, Kurds today appear more able to present a united front and establish security arrangements. Yet new challenges also emerged with the creation of a new KDPS (3 April 2014) vis-à-vis the PYD, formed from the merger of four small Kurdish parties in Syria along with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria  (KDPS, Al Party), the Kurdistan Union Party and two factions of the Kurdistan Freedom Party (Azadi) affiliated with the KRG. 
At this point, and in view of the inter-Kurdish agreement between the KRG and PYD (October 2014) to confront IS, as well as KRG’s initiative for intra- Kurdish solidarity between the KDP and PUK in dealing with Baghdad, it is clear that even though overcoming the differences among political entities is problematic, the road to unification is nevertheless promising and paved with good intentions. In the Kurdish case, the goal for self-determination primarily dictates only unity, and leaves no room for repetition of historical mistakes from any side.  In this context I try to explain why the role of the PKK is today more critical than ever before for achieving the goal of Kurdish unity, using the following diagram which is indicative of the progress made in inter- and intra-Kurdish relations. 
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The focus of this diagram is on the interrelations between the KRG and the PKK-PYD alliance. The arrow in red portrays PKK’s dynamic whereas KRG’s is shown in yellow and PYD’s in green. The reason for selecting PYD –among Syria’s Kurds –is because it represents the majority of the votes along with KDPS, which is already affiliated with the KRG. The PKK-PYD cooperation arrow clearly aligns with the KRG’s arrow as one of the two dimensions for the achievement of the Kurdish cooperation and thus unity.

The PKK is already an established regional entity, identified by long-standing military and political power among the Kurdish movement vis-à-vis its influence in both the Syrian and Iranian part of Kurdistan following the establishment of PJAK (Free Life Party in Kurdistan, پارتی ژیانی ئازادی کوردستان).  Despite its non-state status, the PKK was the official negotiator between the Kurds and the Turkish State, represented by its intelligence institutions, namely MIT, during the negotiations known as the Habur Process (2009) and the 2011 Oslo Talks, and the continuation of this role from January 2013 to the present. 
The empowerment of the KRG from 2003 onwards is, of course, a landmark and is a positive influence on Turkey’s Kurdish movement, but the success of this process will also be dependent first on the PKK’s own willingness for sincere commitment to a peace process devoid of fragmentation and further divisions at the leadership level in favour of different orientation. The PKK has already formed relations based on cooperation with the KRG and it is also strongly affiliated with the PYD and Rojavayê Kurdistan. Thus, as a pre-existing force in comparison to the PYD (or PJAK), it can exert a positive influence on the KRG to strengthen relations between the KRG and the Administration in Rojavayê Kurdistan.
We can thus observe that the dynamic born of the PYD–PKK cooperation constitutes one parameter that, with the KRG’s support, could permit unity to be achieved (as the three coloured arrows indicate). In this context, the KRG as an established and recognized regional player could in turn help Rojavayê Kurdistan to achieve regional and international recognition, especially in light of Turkish Premier Ahmet Davutoğlu’s declarations that “the PYD does not represent all Kurds. On the contrary, there are some groups that have been extremely disturbed by the pressure of the PYD. These groups have asked for our help.” ​[65]​
The KRG and PYD-PKK cooperation (PP) arrows reveal that the PYD is the connecting point between PKK and KRG, whereas the PKK stands out as an influential factor which can bring KRG and Rojava closer, and ultimately achieve unity. 
The Kurdish cooperation depicted in this inter-relational triangle does not oppose the regional environment, where neighbouring states could also benefit since those that come out stronger will be those who best target alliances, including siding with the Kurds. This would not really clash with Turkey’s vision for supremacy and the new role they presume to play in reshaping the Middle East, since “Turkey is surrounded by the Kurds [and thus] unless the Kurdish issue is resolved, they cannot make any opening to the Middle East”.​[66]​ The Turkish administration’s shifting view that “Solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey will also have a positive influence on the Kurdish population in Iran and in Syria” is considerable.​[67]​ On the other hand, Ankara seeks control and security rather than leaving the KRG on the sidelines or continuing a bloody and costly war with the PKK.  The Turkish government’s calls for covert talks with officials from Syria’s self-administered Kurdish region (March 2014) as well as with UN officials based in Gaziantep in southern Turkey to coordinate aid efforts, reflects Ankara’s consideration of the Kurdish militia forces, that is the People’s Protection Units. Meanwhile a new agreement “reached between the YPG and the Turkmen forces in the Tomb of Suleiman Shah, uniting them under the umbrella of a newly formed group called Shams Shemal, or the Northern Sun
Peace with Rojava” is also indicative of this concern. ​[68]​  
Tehran is also very well known for its longstanding tactical desire to meddle with Kurdish parties.  This has been the case regarding the regime’s increasing role in the Kurdish politics of Iraq, especially in the aftermath of IS’s expansion and brutal fighting in the Kurdish territories of Iraq, as well as the PYD’s recent assertions (20 January 2015) about Iranian forces inciting attacks in the oil-rich al-Hasakah province and using local people to spread chaos for fear that Syria’s Kurdish revolution will reach Iranian territory; in fact a second autonomous Kurdish Region on their borders would challenge change. 
Thus it appears that the broader Kurdistan region has once more become the apple of discord between Tehran and Ankara as a broader sphere of influence and control, given its oil reserves, aspirations for autonomy, and competition for regional dominance. Obviously the Kurds’ significance as the immediate neighbours of both Iran and Turkey is important for reasons of stability, both economically and politically. Iranian pressure on the KRG to mobilize forces in the war against IS, fighting the Shiite government in Baghdad, and the economic indicators of $8 billion-worth of trade between the two are illuminating. 
As far as Syria is concerned, its fragmentation, despite Bashar Al Assad’s unparalleled strength in maintaining his power, is a matter of indisputable fact. Future elements to be considered are “the 2,000–4,000 oil wells of Rimelan (Canton Cezire), with a production capacity of almost 440,000 barrels a day and 25 gas wells used so far by the Syrian regime to export 100,000 barrels per day”; in 2010, before the Syrian events started, “oil production had reached 90.000 b/d, to world markets after refining the crude oil in the refineries of Homs and Banias in the Arabic regions of Syria”.​[69]​ 

3.	Re-evaluating IR in the New Middle Eastern Order
The Kurdish role and its interaction with state entities is exactly the new phenomenon that the current transformation of the Middle Eastern region has emphasized, whilst not being a new phenomenon. Having analysed the U.S. interrelation with the Kurds of Iraq since the 1990s in reality, the theoretical implications of this subject matter with Tehran and Ankara, more so than other regional and international state entities interacting with the KRG and the PKK vis-à-vis the inter-relationship between state and non-state actors, are explicit. 
Most of the theories have fallen into the same trap; either of being constrained by particular premises and thus applying their ideas everywhere regardless of context, time or space and confining themselves to endless critiques, or of remaining insufficiently aware of the complex interaction of different levels of actors and structures–especially non-states–and instead being focused primarily on the states. Hence, IR has need of a coherent analysis that will consider all the complexities that I have pointed out. The worst phenomenon, though, is when schools of thoughts are trying desperately to enlarge their analytical scope so as to fit interactions within their own premises and interpretations and adjust to the new theoretical demands of empirical practice, even though the result is not always successful;, such is the case with attempts to structuralize the agency in the example of the English school.​[70]​ Clearly most of the IR paradigms are in one way or another focused on the state and the role of their structures (either material or ideational). 
It seems clear, following my definitions, that IR should take into account the triptych of IR, foreign policy and politics as parts of a unified whole. Perhaps a general conceptual IR framework offering guidance rather than imposing specific premises unaltered according to the time, space and case of reference, might be useful by limiting IR’s abstraction. On this basis, the intermarriage of ontology with epistemology appears necessary. 
What is also made clear, especially in PKK’s interaction with Ankara, is the need for analysis of IR as a series of interrelations between agents of state and non-state status, along with the primacy of their interests, based simultaneously on mutual consideration of the interactive impact upon them of internal developments and international occurrences, including the unexpected. The PKK’s exertion of its own foreign policy practice and discourse along with the operation of its own media is a case in point. 
Undeniably the state-centric nature of the international system through the placement of the state-actor(s) at its heart is the prerequisite. Yet phenomena need to be explained through understanding not only the interplay between the domestic and the external, but also the case studies in their specific context, the role played by ideas in shaping the identity of the actors, as well as the impact their interests bring to bear on their political behaviours. Turkey’s foreign policy or the US case then show how foreign policy can also be affected by, and interact with, non-state entities vis-à-vis both Ankara’s institutionalized relations with the KRG (primarily on an economic level) or the US and Turkey’s political interactions with PKK (on the occasion of the ongoing peace process). 
What I am therefore advocating here is the interplay between state and non-state entities. This conceives of IR as a complex field of multidimensional interrelations between and among actors in the local, sub-state, trans-state, state, regional and global spheres. In particular, it draws attention to the role–both direct and indirect–that is played in IR by non-state actors, though without a priori favouring either type of actor. The interactive importance of the material and the ideational in the mutual shaping of structures and agents in this multidimensional interactive set of dynamics is recognized In my theoretical map, but it further views IR as ‘multidimensional inter-relations’, stressing the need for IR to move away from mere inter-state explanations. 
Moving thus beyond the mainstream, my analytical approach perceives foreign policy analysis as a combined process involving multiple actors (states, individuals and governments) and non-state actors, and is influenced by a series of factors–both ideational and material–that can be either internal or external according to the case under study, the period of examination, and the context of reference. In this case there is a hierarchical relevance that needs to be respected. On this same basis, I have argued that the key role of the PKK movement in bringing the KRG and the PYD together as the first Kurdish de facto state entity in the region can positively affect the Kurdish movement in Syria, to the same extent as a resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue based on constitutional guarantees in occurrence of a successful peace process between the Kurds and Ankara. 
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